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GENERAL



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VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE THOUSAND AND TWENTY-FIFTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York
on Thursday, 25 October 1962, at 10.00 a.m.
TO: () C, AGO () C, OADR

<u>President:</u>	Mr. ZKFIN	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
<u>Members:</u>	Chile	Mr. SCHWEITZER
	China	Mr. LIU
	France	Mr. SEYDOUX
	Ghana	Mr. QUASON-SACKY
	Ireland	Mr. AIKEN
	Romania	Mr. MALITZA
	United Arab Republic	Mr. Mahmoud RIAD
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Sir Patrick DEAN
	United States of America	Mr. STEVENSON
	Venezuela	Mr. SCSA RODRIGUEZ

This record contains original speeches and interpretations. The final text, containing translations, will be distributed as soon as possible.

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Publication of the final printed records being subject to a rigid schedule, the co-operation of delegations in strictly observing this time-limit would be greatly appreciated.

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ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA

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The agenda was adopted.

LETTER DATED 22 OCTOBER 1962 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (S/5181);
LETTER DATED 22 OCTOBER 1962 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CUBA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (S/5183);
LETTER DATED 23 OCTOBER 1962 FROM THE DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (S/5186)

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Russian): In accordance with the decision taken by the Security Council at the 1022nd meeting, I invite the representative of Cuba to take a seat at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Garcia-Inchaustegui, representative of Cuba, took a place at the Security Council table.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Russian): The Council will now continue its consideration of the item before it. The first name on my list of speakers is that of the representative of the United States, upon whom I now call.

Mr. STEVENSON (United States of America): Today we must address our attention to the realities of the situation posed by the build-up of nuclear striking power in Cuba. In this connexion I want to say at the outset that the course adopted by the Soviet Union yesterday to avoid direct confrontations in the zone of quarantine is welcome to my Government. We welcome also the assurance by Chairman Khrushchev in his letter to Earl Russell that the Soviet Union will take no reckless decisions with regard to this crisis. And we welcome most of all the report that Mr. Khrushchev has agreed to the proposals advanced by the Secretary-General. Perhaps that report will be confirmed here today.

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(Mr. Stevenson, United States)

My Government is most anxious to effect a peaceful resolution of this affair. We continue to hope that the Soviet Union will work with us to diminish not only the new danger which has suddenly shadowed the peace but all of the conflicts that divide the world.

I shall not detain the Council with any detailed discussion of the Soviet and the Cuban responses to our complaint. The speeches of the communist representatives were entirely predictable. I shall make brief comment on some points suggested by those speeches and some other points which may have arisen in the minds of Members of the United Nations.

Both Chairman Khrushchev, in his letter to Earl Russell, and Ambassador Zorin, in his remarks to this Council, argued that this threat to the peace had been caused not by the Soviet Union and Cuba but by the United States.

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(Mr. Stevenson, United States)

We are here today, and have been this week, for one single reason: because the Soviet Union secretly introduced this menacing offensive military build-up into the island of Cuba while assuring the world that nothing was further from its thoughts.

The argument of the Soviet Union, in essence, is that it was not the Soviet Union which created this threat to peace by secretly installing these weapons in Cuba, but that it was the United States which created this crisis by discovering and reporting these installations. This is the first time, I confess, that I have ever heard it said that the crime is not the burglary but the discovery of the burglary, and that the threat is not the clandestine missiles in Cuba but their discovery and the limited measures taken to quarantine further infection. The peril arises not because the nations of the Western Hemisphere have joined together to take necessary action in their self-defence but because the Soviet Union has extended its nuclear threat into the Western Hemisphere.

I note that there are still some representatives in the Council -- very few, I suspect -- who say that they do not know whether the Soviet Union has in fact built in Cuba installations capable of firing nuclear missiles over ranges from 1,000 to 2,000 miles. As I say, Chairman Khrushchev did not deny these facts in his letter to Earl Russell, nor did Ambassador Zorin on Tuesday evening, and, if further doubt remains on this score, we shall gladly exhibit photographic evidence to the doubtful.

One other point I should like to make is to invite attention to the casual remark of the Soviet representative claiming that we have thirty-five bases in foreign countries. The fact is that there are missiles comparable to those being placed in Cuba with the forces of only three of our allies. They were established there only by a decision of the Heads of Government meeting in December 1957, which was compelled to authorize such arrangements by virtue of a prior Soviet decision to introduce its own missiles capable of destroying the countries of Western Europe.

In the next place, there are some troublesome questions in the minds of Members that are entitled to serious answers. There are those who say that, conceding the fact that the Soviet Union has installed these offensive missiles in Cuba, conceding the fact that this constitutes a grave threat to the peace of

(Mr. Stevenson, United States)

the world, why was it necessary for the nations of the Western Hemisphere to act with such speed? Why could not the quarantine against the shipment of offensive weapons have been delayed until the Security Council and the General Assembly had a full opportunity to consider the situation and make recommendations?

Let me remind the Members that the United States was not looking for some pretext to raise the issue of the transformation of Cuba into a military base. On the contrary, the United States made no objection whatever to the shipment of defensive arms by the Soviet Union to Cuba, even though such shipments offended the traditions of this hemisphere. Even after the first hard intelligence reached Washington concerning the change in the character of Soviet military assistance to Cuba, the President of the United States responded by directing an intensification of surveillance, and only after the facts and the magnitude of the build-up had been established beyond all doubt did we begin to take this limited action of barring only those nuclear weapons, equipment and aircraft.

To understand the reasons for this prompt action, it is necessary to understand the nature and the purposes of this operation. It has been marked, above all, by two characteristics: speed and stealth. As the photographic evidence makes clear, the installation of these missiles, the erection of these missile sites, has taken place with extraordinary speed. One entire complex was put up in twenty-four hours. This speed not only demonstrates the methodical organization and the careful planning involved, but it also demonstrates a premeditated attempt to confront this hemisphere with a fait accompli. By quickly completing the whole process of nuclearization of Cuba, the Soviet Union would be in a position to demand that the status quo be maintained and left undisturbed -- and, if we were to have delayed our counteraction, the nuclearization of Cuba would have been quickly completed.

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DECLASSIFIED (Mr. Stevenson, United States)

This is not a risk which this hemisphere is prepared to take. When we first detected the secret and offensive installations, could we reasonably be expected to have notified the Soviet Union in advance, through the process of calling a meeting of the Security Council, that we had discovered its perfidy, and then to have done nothing but wait while we debated, and then have waited further while the Soviet representative in the Security Council vetoed a resolution, as he has already announced he will do? In different circumstances, we would have done so, but today we are dealing with dread realities and not with wishes.

One of the sites, as I have said, was constructed in twenty-four hours. One of these missiles can be armed with its nuclear warhead in the middle of the night, pointed at New York, and landed above this room five minutes after it was fired. No debate in this room could affect in the slightest the urgency of these terrible facts or the immediacy of the threat to peace.

There was only one way to deal with the emergency and with the immediacy, and that was to act, and to act at once, but with the utmost restraint consistent with the urgency of the threat to the peace. We came to the Security Council, I would remind you, immediately and concurrently with the Organization of the American States. We did not even wait for the Organization of American States to meet and to act. We came here at the same time.

We immediately put into process the political machinery that we pray will achieve a solution of this grave crisis, and we did not act until the American Republics had acted to make the quarantine effective. We did not shirk our duties to ourselves, to the hemisphere, to the United Nations or to the rest of the world.

We are now in the Security Council on the initiative of the United States, precisely because having taken the hemispheric action which has been taken, we wish the political machinery, the machinery of the United Nations, to take over to reduce these tensions and to interpose itself to eliminate this aggressive threat to peace and to ensure the removal from this hemisphere of offensive nuclear weapons and the corresponding lifting of the quarantine.

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DECLASSIFIED (Mr. Stevenson, United States)

There are those who say that the quarantine is an inappropriate and extreme remedy; that the punishment does not fit the crime. But I would ask those who take this position to put themselves in the position of the Organization of American States and to consider what they would have done in the face of the nuclearization of Cuba. Were we to do nothing until the knife was sharpened? Were we to stand idly by until it was at our throats? What were the alternatives available? On the one hand, the Organization of American States might have sponsored an invasion or destroyed the bases by an air strike, or imposed a total blockade of all imports into Cuba, including medicine and food. On the other hand, the Organization of American States and the United States might have done nothing. Such a course would have confirmed the greatest threat to the peace of the Americas known to history and would have encouraged the Soviet Union in similar adventures in other parts of the world. It would have discredited our will and our determination to live in freedom and to reduce, not increase, the perils of this nuclear age.

The course we have chosen seems to me to be perfectly graduated to meet the character of the threat. To have done less would have been to fail in our obligation to peace.

To those who say that a limited quarantine was too much, in spite of the provocation and the danger, let me tell them a story, attributed, like so many stories of America, to Abraham Lincoln. It is a story about a passerby in my part of the country who was charged by a farmer's ferocious boar. He picked up a pitchfork and met the boar head on and it died. The irate farmer denounced him and asked him why he did not use the blunt end of the pitchfork. The man replied by asking why the boar did not attack me with his blunt end.

Some here have attempted to question the legal basis of the defensive measures taken by the American Republics to protect the Western Hemisphere against Soviet long-range nuclear missiles, and I would gladly expand on our position on this, but in view of the proposal now before us, presented last night by the Acting Secretary-General, perhaps this is a matter for discussion which, in view of its complexity and length, could be more fruitfully delayed to a later time.

DECLASSIFIED (Mr. Stevenson, United States)

Finally, let me say that no twisting of logic, no distortion of words can disguise the plain and obvious and compelling, commonsense conclusion that the installation of nuclear weapons by stealth, the installation of weapons of mass destruction in Cuba poses a dangerous threat to peace, a threat which contravenes paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the Charter, and a threat which the American Republics are entitled to meet, as they have done, by appropriate regional defensive methods.

Nothing has been said here by the representatives of the communist States which alters the basic situation. There is one fundamental question to which I solicit your attention. The question is this: what action served to strengthen the world's hope of peace? Can anyone claim that the introduction of long-range nuclear missiles into Cuba strengthens the peace? Can anyone claim that the speed and the stealth of this operation strengthens the peace? Can anyone suppose that this whole undertaking is anything more than an audacious effort to increase the nuclear striking power of the Soviet Union against the United States and thereby magnify its frequently reiterated threats against Berlin? When we are about to debate how to stop the dissemination of nuclear weapons, does their introduction into a new hemisphere by an outside State advance sanity and peace? Does anyone suppose that if this Soviet adventure went unchecked, the Soviet Union would refrain from similar adventures in other parts of the world?

The one action in the last few days which has strengthened the peace is the determination to stop this further spread of weapons in this hemisphere. In view of the situation that now confronts us, and the proposals made here yesterday by the Acting Secretary-General, I am not going to further extend my remarks this afternoon. I wish only to conclude by reading to the members of the Council the letter from the President of the United States which was delivered to the Acting Secretary-General just a few minutes ago in reply to his appeal of last night. He said to U Thant:

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(Mr. Stevenson, United States)

"I deeply appreciate the spirit which prompted your message of yesterday. As we made clear in the Security Council, the existing threat was created by the secret introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba, and the answer lies in the removal of such weapons. In your message and in your statement to the Security Council last night, you have made certain suggestions and have invited preliminary talks to determine whether satisfactory arrangements can be assured. Ambassador Stevenson is ready to discuss promptly these arrangements with you. I can assure you of our desire to reach a satisfactory and a peaceful solution of this matter."

That letter is signed "John F. Kennedy". I have nothing further to say at this time.

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SECRET

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Russian): Does any other representative wish to speak?

Mr. GARCIA-INCHAUSTEGUI (Cuba) (interpretation from Spanish):

I shall be very brief.

The statement made a few moments ago by the representative of the United States Government constitutes the strongest proof that the grave international crisis provoked by the United States Government in deciding on a unilateral warlike measure against the Revolutionary Government and people of Cuba was based on mere bluff. The representative of the United States presented no valid proof of the affirmation by the President that Cuba constitutes a nuclear threat to the countries of the Western Hemisphere.

The weapons that Cuba possesses are exclusively defensive weapons. They are weapons that we have been forced to acquire because of the aggressive and interventionist policy pursued by the United States Government against Cuba.

This attitude of the United States is another proof of its manoeuvres designed to cover up attacks and aggression against our territory, our sovereignty and our independence.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Russian): We have listened to the statement by the representative of the United States, Mr. Stevenson. As distinct from the statement which he made at the first meeting of the Council, Mr. Stevenson has not attempted this time to prove the rightness of the position of the United States with regard to the basic motive for having brought up the question of alleged aggressive intentions on the part of Cuba and the Soviet Union. The whole of Mr. Stevenson's speech at today's meeting was obviously defensive in character. He sought to assure the Council that the actions of the United States which have precipitated the serious crisis in the world had in fact some justification.

SECRET

(The President)

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He attempted to prove that the United States could not have acted in any other manner than to declare this self-instituted blockade and to undertake these piratical acts on the high seas, and that the Organization of American States likewise could not have acted in any other manner -- the organization which, in this instance, was acting under the pressure of the United States.

The principal motive for the action of the United States, as Mr. Stevenson attempted to prove today, was allegedly the action of the Soviet Union and of Cuba itself through the introduction of nuclear weapons in Cuba, the establishment of offensive military installations on Cuba, and so forth. Mr. Stevenson wished to show that it is universally recognized and axiomatic that in these circumstances the only thing that could have been undertaken was the declaration of a blockade, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the universally recognized principles of international law.

The groundlessness of such a position is altogether too clear. The Soviet delegation in its first statement explained in great detail that the point here does not lie in what the United States Press and the President of the United States labelled "the incontrovertible facts of offensive weapons being installed in Cuba", but in the aggressive intentions of the United States with respect to Cuba. That is where the core of the matter lies.

But when the United States attempted to launch these aggressive actions and to put them into effect, they were met with the resistance of world public opinion on the part of the overwhelming majority of the Members of the United Nations, who were deeply concerned by these aggressive actions and who have exerted great pressure upon the United States and all the countries supporting it in order to avert any further dangerous actions by the United States. Following this, Mr. Stevenson was obliged, on the directives of his Government, to change his tone. His statement today -- and all those present in the Council today heard this -- was quite different from the aggressive speech that he made at the first meeting of the Council on this matter, a speech which found some support only on the part of the direct allies of the United States, which, although they speak a great deal about their own independent policies, are nevertheless obliged to follow the course dictated by Washington. These representatives of the

(The President)

independent countries that are not associated with any military blocs have openly stated in the Council -- and we heard their statements yesterday -- that the blockade is an unlawful act, and that it runs counter to the Charter of the United Nations and to the universally recognized principles of international law. The representatives spoke in defence of the right of Cuba to set up its defences in a manner which it considers necessary for itself. They spoke in defence of the right of the Cuban people to independence and of the right of the Cuban State to its independent existence. They openly condemned these aggressive actions of the United States. They were not speaking only on their own behalf. They spoke -- as the representative of the United Arab Republic stated -- on behalf of more than forty countries of Africa and Asia which are not connected with any military blocs. Their voice forced the United States to reflect and ponder on any further steps that it may take.

In connexion with Mr. Stevenson's attempt today to accuse the Soviet Union of being the main cause of these aggressive actions on the part of the United States, I should like to draw the attention of all the members of the Council to the shocking fact of the provocative actions of the United States Government, actions which are completely unjustified. I wish to draw the attention of the Council to the following circumstance. In the statement of the President of the United States on 22 October 1962, Mr. Kennedy said:

"Within the past week unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation on that imprisoned island.

"The purpose of these bases can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere."

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(The President)

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Mr. Kennedy went on to say:

"Upon receiving the first preliminary hard information of this nature last Tuesday morning at 9 a.m." -- last Tuesday morning was 16 October -- "I directed that our surveillance be stepped up. And having now confirmed and completed our evaluation of the evidence and our decision on a course of action, this Government feels obliged to report this new crisis to you in fullest detail."

Let us establish the first fact. On 16 October the President of the United States had in his hands incontrovertible information. What happened after that? On 18 October the President of the United States was receiving the representative of the Soviet Union, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Gromyko, two days after he had already in his hands incontrovertible evidence. One may well ask, Why did the President of the United States -- in receiving the Minister of another Power which the Government of the United States is now accusing of dispatching offensive arms to Cuba against the United States -- not say a word to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union with respect to these incontrovertible facts? Why? Because no such facts exist. The Government of the United States has no such facts in its hand except the falsified information of the United States Intelligence Agency which are being displayed for review in halls and which are sent to the Press. Falsity is what the United States has in its hands -- false evidence.

If there were any incontrovertible facts, the elementary rules of relations between States would have required that the President of the United States -- in receiving the Minister for Foreign Affairs of another Power which it is now accusing -- present such facts. These are the elementary requirements of normal relations between States in our dangerous times, particularly when the United States considers that it is essential to adopt such extraordinary measures as the declaring of a blockade. On 18 October, the President of the United States said nothing at all to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, whereas on 22 October he declared a blockade and also that he would sink Soviet ships. Are these normal relations of one great Power with another -- a great Power which is observing the principles of the Charter and the norms of international law? No, this is highway robbery... But one cannot enter into normal relations with such highway robbers.

(The President)

That is why the more reasonable representatives of the United States Press today are speaking to the effect that this has been a grave error. I should like to refer to an article by Mr. Walter Lippmann, who is wise as a result of considerable experience and is very well informed. Mr. Lippmann wrote today the following:

"I see the danger of this mistake in the fact that when the President saw Mr. Gromyko on Thursday" -- this was on 18 October, precisely -- "and had the evidence of the missile build-up in Cuba, he refrained from confronting Mr. Gromyko with this evidence. This was to suspend diplomacy."

Mr. Stevenson, at the session of the General Assembly, you said that the United States is in favour of peaceful, normal and quiet diplomacy, that you are against the cold war, that you are against any actions that might upset the peace and might create tensions. Where is your diplomacy -- where is it? Instead of resorting to diplomatic processes at the highest levels -- for the President to confront the representative of a country against which it intends to use armed force -- instead of confronting that representative with facts which call for examination, instead of that, your President said nothing to Gromyko on this subject. And I can say more: he was assuring that nothing was being contemplated by the United States against Cuba and that the information which the Soviet Government has published is one which he trusts. How is it that you can act in this fashion, that you keep a double accounting system? You say one thing in your official talks, and two days later you declare: "the Soviet Union has deceived us."

No, I beg your pardon, you are the ones who are deceiving your own people and the whole world. In fact, this is precisely what is being written by the United States Press itself. I should like to draw attention to the New York Herald Tribune where the following is written:

"Today, on Friday" -- on 19 October -- the Newspaper writes "as well as the whole of the week-end, the Defense Department had declared that it has no information indicating the presence of any offensive armaments in Cuba." And yet, the President stated in his speech that he had discovered such rockets at 9 a.m., on Tuesday, 16 October, in other words, six days earlier.

(The President)

Then, citing a whole series of other official statements, the newspaper posed the question -- and I ask this question again here:

"If the lie must be pronounced, then the public has also the right to put the question: when did the lie begin? When did the lie stop?" This is a legitimate question by the American Press.

I shall not go further on this subject. But from what I have already said, from the facts which are incontrovertible and which cannot be denied by Mr. Stevenson, it will be obvious that the Government of the United States has deliberately intensified the crisis, it has deliberately prepared this provocation and it has tried to cover up this provocation by means of a discussion in the Security Council at a time when there was no foundation for that whatsoever; and now you cannot advance any justification either, apart from the falsified information supplied by your Intelligence Agency. But you cannot conduct world policies and world politics on such a basis. Such opportunistic steps can lead you to catastrophic consequences for the whole world and the Soviet Government has issued a warning to the United States and to the world on that score.

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(The President)

Mr. Stevenson referred to Mr. Khrushchev's letter to Bertrand Russell. His interpretation of that letter is completely out of keeping with the letter's contents. I should like to read out a portion of the letter so that the Council may see what is the actual position of the Soviet Union.

In the face of the provocation of the United States, which is threatening the world with thermonuclear war, Mr. Khrushchev declared the following in his letter of 24 October to Bertrand Russell:

"... We shall do everything possible to prevent this catastrophe. But it must be borne in mind that our efforts may prove insufficient. Indeed, our efforts and possibilities are efforts and possibilities of one side. If the United States Government carries out the programme of piratic actions outlined by it, we shall have to resort to means of defence against the aggressor to defend our rights and international rights which are written down in international agreements and expressed in the United Nations Charter. We have no other way out. It is well known that if one tries to appease a robber by giving him at first one's purse, and then one's coat, the robber will not become more merciful, will not stop robbing. On the contrary, he will become increasingly insolent. Therefore, it is necessary to curb the highwayman in order to prevent the law of the jungle from becoming the law governing relations between civilized people and States.

"The Soviet Government considers that the Government of the United States of America must display reserve and stay the execution of its piratical threats, which are fraught with most serious consequences.

"The question of war and peace is so vital that we consider useful a top-level meeting in order to discuss all the problems which have arisen, to do everything to remove the danger of unleashing a thermonuclear war. As long as rocket nuclear weapons are not put into play, it is still possible to avert war. When aggression will have been unleashed by the Americans, such a meeting will already have become impossible and useless."

That is the position of the Soviet Union on this matter. It has been consistently expressed by the Soviet delegation, from the very outset of the discussion of the question.

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DECLASSIFIED (The President)

In connexion with the initiative of the Acting Secretary-General, U Thant, we have handed over to Mr. Thant an answer which has been sent today by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. N.S. Khrushchev, to the letter to which the Acting Secretary-General referred yesterday. I shall now read out the text of that answer:

"Esteemed U Thant,

"I have received your appeal and carefully studied the proposals it contains. I welcome your initiative. I understand your concern about the situation obtaining in the Caribbean, since the Soviet Government also considers this situation as highly dangerous and requiring an immediate intercession by the United Nations.

"I wish to inform you that I agree with your proposal, which meets the interests of peace.

Respectfully,

N. Khrushchev."

I should like to conclude my statement with that reply from Mr. Khrushchev.

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Mr. STEVENSON (United States of America): I want to say to you, Mr. Zorin, that I do not have your talent for obfuscation, for distortion, for confusing language and for double-talk -- and I must confess to you that I am glad I do not. But, if I understood what you said, you said that my position had changed: that today I was defensive because we do not have the evidence to prove our assertions that your Government had installed long-range missiles in Cuba. Well, let me say something to you, Mr. Ambassador: We do have the evidence. We have it, and it is clear and incontrovertible. And let me say something else: Those weapons must be taken out of Cuba.

Next, let me say to you that, if I understood you, you said -- with a trespass on credulity that excels your best -- that our position had changed since I spoke here the other day because of the pressures of world opinion and a majority of the United Nations. Well, let me say to you, sir: You are wrong again. We have had no pressure from anyone whatsoever. We came here today to indicate our willingness to discuss U Thant's proposals -- and that is the only change that has taken place.

But let me also say to you, sir, that there has been a change. You, the Soviet Union, have sent these weapons to Cuba. You, the Soviet Union, have upset the balance of power in the world. You, the Soviet Union, have created this new danger -- not the United States.

You asked, with a fine show of indignation, why the President did not tell Mr. Gromyko last Thursday about our evidence, at the very time that Mr. Gromyko was blandly denying to the President that the USSR was placing such weapons on sites in the New World. Well, I will tell you why: because we were assembling the evidence -- and perhaps it would be instructive to the world to see how far a Soviet official would go in perfidy. Perhaps we wanted to know whether this country faced another example of nuclear deceit like the one a year ago, when in stealth the Soviet Union broke the nuclear test moratorium. And, while we are asking questions, let me ask you why your Government, your Foreign Minister, deliberately, cynically deceived us about the nuclear build-up in Cuba.

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(Mr. Stevenson, United States)

Finally, Mr. Zorin, I remind you that the other day you did not deny the existence of these weapons. Instead, we heard that they had suddenly become defensive weapons. But today -- again, if I heard you correctly -- you say that they do not exist, or that we have not proved they exist -- and you say this with another fine flood of rhetorical scorn. All right, sir, let me ask you one simple question: Do you, Ambassador Zorin, deny that the USSR has placed and is placing medium and intermediate-range missiles and sites in Cuba? Yes or no? Do not wait for the interpretation. Yes or no?

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Russian): I am not in an American courtroom, sir, and therefore I do not wish to answer a question that is put to me in the fashion in which a prosecutor puts questions. In due course, sir, you will have your reply.

Mr. STEVENSON (United States of America): You are in the courtroom of world opinion right now, and you can answer "Yes" or "No". You have denied that they exist -- and I want to know whether I have understood you correctly.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Russian): Will you please continue your statement, sir? You will have your answer in due course.

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Mr. STEVENSON (United States of America): I am prepared to wait for my answer until Hell freezes over, if that is your decision. I am also prepared to present the evidence in this room.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Russian): I call on the representative of Chile.

Mr. SCHWEITZER (Chile (interpretation from Spanish): I did not expect the incident which has just occurred, Mr. President, but since it has occurred I would prefer to yield the floor to you and to ask for the floor again when you feel it is necessary or after you have been good enough to reply to the question put to you by the United States representative. Therefore, that being the case, I am quite willing to yield the floor to you.

Mr. STEVENSON (United States of America): I had not finished my statement. I asked you a question, Mr. President, and I have had no reply to that question. I will now proceed, if I may, to finish my statement.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Russian): By all means, you may proceed.

Mr. STEVENSON (United States of America): I doubt whether anyone in this room, except possibly the representative of the Soviet Union, has any doubt about the facts, but in view of his statements and the statements of the Soviet Government up until last Thursday, when Mr. Gromyko denied the existence of or any intention of installing such weapons in Cuba, I am going to make a portion of the evidence available right now. If you will indulge me for a moment, we will set up an easel here in the back of the room where I hope it will be visible to everyone.

The first of these exhibits shows an area north of the village of Candelaria, near San Cristóbal in the island of Cuba, south-west of Havana. The map, together with a small photograph shows precisely where the area is in Cuba. The first photograph shows the area in late August 1962. It was there, if you can see from where you are sitting, only a peaceful countryside. The second photograph shows the same area one day last week. A few tents and vehicles had come into the area, new spur roads had appeared, and the main road had been improved.

(Mr. Stevenson, United States)

The third photograph, taken only twenty-four hours later, shows facilities for a medium-range missile battalion installed. There are tents for four or five hundred men. At the end of the new spur road there are seven 1,000-mile missile trailers. There are four launcher-erector mechanisms for placing these trailers in erect firing position. This missile is a mobile weapon which can be moved rapidly from one place to another. It is identical with the 1,000-mile missiles which have been displayed in Moscow parades.

All of this, I remind you, took place in twenty-four hours.

The second exhibit, which you can all examine at your leisure, shows three successive photographic enlargements of another missile base of the same type in the area of San Cristóbal. These enlarged photographs clearly show six of these missiles on trailers and three erectors. That is only one example of the first type of ballistic missile installation in Cuba.

A second type of installation is designed for a missile of intermediate range, a range of about 2,200 miles. Each site of this type has four launching pads. The exhibit on this type of missile shows a launching area being constructed near Guanajay, south-west of the city of Havana. As in the first exhibit, a map and small photograph show this area as it appeared in late August 1962, when no military activities were apparent. A second large photograph shows the same area about six weeks later. Here you will see a very heavy construction effort to push the launching area to rapid completion. The pictures show two large concrete bunkers or control centres in process of construction, one between each pair of launching pads. They show heavy concrete retaining walls being erected to shelter vehicles and equipment from rocket blast-off. They show cable scars leading from the launching pad to the bunkers. They show large, reinforced-concrete buildings under construction. A building with a heavy arch may well be intended as the storage area for the nuclear warheads. The installation is not yet complete and no warheads are yet visible.

The next photograph shows a closer view of the same intermediate-range launching site. Here you can clearly see one of the pairs of large, concrete launching pads with the concrete building from which launching operations for three pads are controlled. Other details are visible, such as fuel-tanks. That is only one example, one illustration of the work going forward in Cuba on intermediate-range missile bases.

The PRESIDENT (Interpretation from Russian): I now call on the representative of Ghana.

Mr. QUAISSON-SACKY (Ghana): I would prefer to speak towards the end of the meeting.

Mr. Mahmoud RIAD (United Arab Republic): The Council has just heard the message of President Kennedy in response to the appeal which was addressed to him by the Acting Secretary-General. The delegation of the United Arab Republic cannot but hail the instructions of President Kennedy to Mr. Stevenson to discuss promptly the arrangements proposed by Acting Secretary-General U Thant, and we acknowledge Mr. Kennedy's desire to reach a satisfactory and peaceful solution of this matter. This is a very welcome step forward and one, we believe, in the right direction which should be seized by all members of the Council.

We also welcome Chairman Khrushchev's letter to the Acting Secretary-General agreeing to his proposal, which meets the interests of peace, and I believe that the climate is ripe for the parties to come together.

This is a historical moment indeed, and I think that the members of the Council should start in a businesslike fashion to prepare the way for the negotiations. Let us profit from the declared good intentions of both sides, and let them begin negotiations without losing any more time.

In conclusion, I should like to express our satisfaction at the developments so far. We shall watch very closely how things develop. But I shall close on a note of optimism which is based on the fact that the response of President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev was in fact a direct result of the concern of the members of the Council and world opinion in general and the determination to have a peaceful solution of the present crisis.

If there are no more speakers on the list, the members of the Council might agree that, in the light of the recent developments, particularly the encouraging statements of the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union, the Council should adjourn its meetings.

DECLASSIFIED

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Russian): I should like to make a short statement in my capacity as representative of the Soviet Union.

Mr. Stevenson has asked me to answer his question about the sending of nuclear weapons to Cuba and has demonstrated what he called proof which the United States could present as evidence. I shall limit myself to a brief answer. The answer to Mr. Stevenson has already been given by the Government of the Soviet Union, and I shall recall the content of that reply.

The Government of the Soviet Union -- this was stated in Tass on 11 September and the statement was authorized by the Government -- does not need to relocate in any other country, for example in Cuba, its available means to repel aggression or to make a retaliatory blow. Our nuclear means are so powerful in their explosive capability and the Soviet Union has such powerful delivery vehicles for these nuclear weapons that there is no need to seek any further sites for them anywhere outside the borders of the Soviet Union.

This is the answer to the question. We have no need to deploy anywhere, including Cuba, any of our powerful rockets and delivery vehicles. Accordingly, the questions which Mr. Stevenson attempted to put are in fact purely rhetorical.

In addition, Mr. Stevenson himself said that Mr. Gromyko, in his conversations with President Kennedy, denied the presence of such offensive weapons in Cuba. What else would you need, Sir? This is my answer to your question.

The second comment that I wish to make deals with the so-called evidence and photographs that have been demonstrated here by Mr. Stevenson. Tactics of that kind, of course, have been utilized previously by Mr. Stevenson, but not very successfully. At the meeting of the First Committee, on 15 April 1961 -- and this can be verified by the verbatim record (A/C.1/PV.1149) -- Mr. Stevenson displayed photographs of a Cuban aircraft which allegedly had fired upon Havana, an aircraft which was supposed to have been part of the Cuban Air Force. Mr. Stevenson showed us these photographs and said: these planes have "the markings of the Castro Air Force..." I hope that Mr. Stevenson will not deny that this was so.

(The President)

However, on 1 May, after the failure of the whole enterprise, The New York Times wrote as follows:

"The operation began with an attack upon the Cuban air fields by light bombers of the B-26 type. In accordance with the best cloak and dagger traditions, in order to ensure the plausibility of the version that the bombings were carried out by pilots who had fled from the Castro army, an old Cuban B-26 plane was shot through with a few bullets of 0.3 calibre."

The photograph of this aircraft, which was put together by the United States Intelligence Agency, was presented as evidence to the First Committee to show that allegedly the Cubans themselves and Cuban aircraft were firing upon Havana. This is a fact, and this fact cannot be denied.

What value is there in all your photographs? One who has lied once will not be believed a second time. Accordingly, Mr. Stevenson, we shall not look at your photographs. If you had anything in the way of serious evidence, you should have presented it, as Mr. Lippmann recommended, in accordance with diplomatic practice to the Government which you are accusing. You have not done so. You have utilized the Security Council for a display of your photographs.

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(The President)

I think that this task is seriousness. And I had a higher opinion of you, personally. Unfortunately, I was in error. I regret this very much.

And the last thing I wish to say, I presume that all this performance, that all this display illustrates but one thing: the wish to detract the Council from the principal issue, namely, the violation by the United States of the universally recognized norms of international law and of the Charter of the United Nations, and from the institution of a blockade in an arbitrary fashion which in fact constitutes an act of war -- to detract the Council from this is your principal task. That is why you are displaying all sorts of forged photographs of this kind. I do not wish to enter into a discussion of these photographs and of this evidence because I do not wish to abet your detracting the Council from the important task before it. That, in fact, is my answer to your statements and to your question.

As for the proposal that has been made by the representative of the United Arab Republic, I take it that we would need to have an exchange of opinions on this subject, and after that we shall be able to adopt the decision that might be called for.

If there is no objection, I shall call on the representative of Ghana after the interpretation.

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REPORT

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Russian): Before calling on the representative of Ghana, I shall call on the United States representative, who has asked to speak and to whom the representative of Ghana has ceded his place.

Mr. STEVENSON (United States of America): I shall detain the Council only a moment.

I have not had a direct answer to my question. The representative of the Soviet Union said that the official answer of the Soviet Union was the Tass statement that the USSR does not need to locate missiles in Cuba. I agree: the USSR does not need to do that. But the question is not whether the USSR needs missiles in Cuba. The question is: has the USSR missiles in Cuba? And that question remains unanswered. I knew it would remain unanswered.

As to the authenticity of the photographs, about which Mr. Zorin has spoken with such scorn, I wonder if the Soviet Union would ask their Cuban colleagues to permit a United Nations team to go to these sites. If so, Mr. Zorin, I can assure you that we can direct them to the proper places very quickly.

And now I hope that we can get down to business, that we can stop this sparring. We know the facts, Mr. Zorin, and so do you, and we are ready to talk about them. Our job here is not to score debating points: our job, Mr. Zorin, is to save the peace. If you are ready to try, we are.

Mr. QUAISEN-SACKEE (Ghana): These are grave times. I agree with the representative of the United States that our job is to save the peace. Indeed, my delegation welcomes the responses conveyed by the President of the United States and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union to the timely appeal and constructive suggestions addressed to them yesterday by the Acting Secretary-General. My delegation wishes to record its warmest appreciation to U Thant for this tremendous show of statesmanship and initiative. The Acting Secretary-General's appeal and suggestions followed, as members of the Council are aware, a démarche made to him by the representatives of Cyprus and the United Arab Republic and by me as representative of Ghana, in the name of the representatives of some fifty States Members of our Organization.

(Mr. Quaison-Sackey, Ghana)

All these representatives, sensitive to the waves of alarm which were engulfing all humanity and responding to the concern of their Governments and peoples about the increasingly dangerous situation, authorized an approach to the Acting Secretary-General with the suggestion that he might appeal to the parties concerned, in the interest of international peace and security, to refrain from any action which might aggravate this situation.

My delegation is happy that this appeal has been made and has evoked a generally favourable response from both sides. Our understanding of this response, indeed our hope and prayer, is that while refraining from any action which might aggravate the situation, the parties concerned -- that is to say the United States, Cuba and the Soviet Union -- will avail themselves of the Acting Secretary-General's offer of assistance to facilitate the negotiations on the immediate steps to be taken to remove the existing threat to world peace and to normalize the situation in the Caribbean.

In this connexion, my delegation commends the suggestions made by the Acting Secretary-General, which we are confident will greatly ease the situation and give time for the necessary discussions and negotiations to get under way. My delegation earnestly hopes that it will be possible for the Acting Secretary-General to continue his vigorous task and to report in time to the Security Council meeting in conclave. We are confident that when the time comes the parties, in conjunction with the Acting Secretary-General, would then approach the President of the Council at the time so that we could have a meeting to consider this situation further. In this connexion then, my delegation will support the motion for adjournment made by the representative of the United Arab Republic. I think that will come then under rule 33 of our rules of procedure.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Russian): As I understand it, a proposal was made by the representative of the United Arab Republic, supported by the representative of Ghana, to postpone the further work of the Council and to adjourn the meeting. Under the rules of procedure of the Council, such a proposal has to be decided upon without debate. However, the representative of Chile had asked to speak and I should therefore like to ask him whether he wishes to speak on this proposal or on any other matter. I should also like to turn to the authors

(The President)

of the proposal which is now before us and ask them whether they would object to my granting the floor to the representative of Chile. If the members of the Security Council and more particularly the authors of the proposal do not object to having the floor ceded to the representative of Chile, I as President would see no objection inasmuch as he had been on the speakers' list earlier and had ceded his turn.

There appears to be no objection. In that case I shall call upon the representative of Chile.

Mr. SCHEWITZER (Chile): (interpretation from Spanish): Mr. President, I wish to thank you and the members of the Council for granting me an opportunity to say what I had planned to say earlier when I preferred, however, to yield the floor to the President, allowing him to answer questions that had been asked of him. When I asked to speak at that time, I was going to make a proposal similar to the one that was later made by the representative of the United Arab Republic and that was so eloquently supported and seconded by the representative of Ghana.

I entirely agree with what they have both said. The initiative taken by the Acting Secretary-General was necessary, and I was very happy that I was able to say this in the statement I made yesterday afternoon during the debate. I am proud of the way the Acting Secretary-General is shouldering his responsibilities and the very heavy duties that fall on him on behalf of our Organization.

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(Mr. Schweitzer, Chile)

I am highly gratified at the welcome that was given his initiative by the heads of Government, namely, the President of the United States and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union. I only hope that the conversations that will be undertaken with the assistance of U Thant, which will relieve the entire world, will be successful for the sake of peace which lies basically at the very heart of the thoughts of mankind and which also is the main concern of the people and Government of Chile.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Russian): Thus, is there any objection to the proposal made by the representatives of the United Arab Republic and Ghana? As I hear no objection, the proposal is adopted and I take it that in the light of the results of the discussions that will take place, the President will decide on the future work of the Council on this subject.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 7.25 p.m.

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